|
Constitutional Self-Government
By
Christopher L. Eisgruber,,
Description
Most of us regard the Constitution as
the foundation of American democracy. How, then, are we to understand
the restrictions that it imposes on legislatures and voters? Why, for
example, does the Constitution allow unelected judges to exercise so
much power? And why is this centuries-old document so difficult to
amend? In short, how can we call ourselves a democracy when we are
bound by an entrenched, and sometimes counter-majoritarian,
constitution?
In Constitutional Self-Government,
Christopher Eisgruber focuses directly on the Constitution\\\'s
seemingly undemocratic features. Whereas other scholars have tried to
reconcile these features with majority rule, or simply acknowledged
them as necessary limits on democracy, Eisgruber argues that
constitutionalism is best regarded not as a constraint upon
self-government, but as a crucial ingredient in a complex,
non-majoritarian form of democracy. In an original and provocative
argument, he contends that legislatures and elections provide only an
incomplete representation of the people, and he claims that the
Supreme Court should be regarded as another of the institutions able
to speak for Americans about justice. At a pivotal moment of
worldwide interest in judicial review and renewed national
controversy over the Supreme Court\\\'s role in politics, Constitutional
Self-Government ingeniously locates the Constitution\\\'s value in its
capacity to sustain an array of institutions that render
self-government meaningful for a large and diverse people.
Contents
Introduction
1. The Democratic Functions of
Inflexible Constitutions
2. Judicial Review and Democratic
Legitimacy
3. Judicial Review and Democratic
Flourishing
4. Text and History in Hard Cases
5. Liberty, Strategy, and
Tradition
6. Judicial Maintenance of
Political Institutions
Conclusion
Notes
Index
|
Home
Login
