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A Common Law Theory of Judicial Review
By
W. J. Waluchow
Description
In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues
that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of
rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities.
Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable,
fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders
consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible
and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law,
constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic
representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights
that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one
not only to answer to critics’ most serious challenges, but
also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and
enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional
democracy.
• Clearly written and relatively
free of technical jargon • Covers a broad range of disciplines:
law, philosophy, political theory, moral theory, constitutional
theory • Of interest to those concerned with the role of
unelected judges in a democracy - particularly the role of supreme
courts in shaping policy
Contents
1. A charter revolution; 2.
Constitutionalism; 3. Why charters?; 4. The critic’s case; 5. A
mixed blessing; 6. Common law constitutionalism.
Reviews
\\\'This book will probably come to form
part of the canon of constitutional law literature, not only because
it provides a sound justification for the existence of judicial
review, but also because it gives a compelling orientation as to how
it should be exercised.\\\' The Cambridge Law Journal
\\\'A thought provoking contribution to a
debate of enormous importance.\\\' Journal of the Commonwealth Lawyers
association
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